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STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH MARINE INSURANCE
CONTRACTS: CONFLICTING RULES IN THE NINTH
CIRCUIT
Rhea D. Pappas-Ward*
Abstract. Under the federal admiralty "strict compliance rule," a policy of marine insurance is
voided by an insured vessel owner's failure to comply with express policy terms or "warranties."
Although recognized and applied by a majority of the federal circuits, the strict compliance rule has
been improperly ignored by a handful of district courts within the Ninth Circuit. Instead, by
misapplying the holding of Wilburn Boat v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., a 1955 Supreme Court
case, and by ignoring the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Wilburn Boat in Bohemia, Inc. v. Home
Insurance Co., these district courts have turned to state insurance law, requiring a causal or other
relationship between a breached policy warranty and the loss before voiding coverage. This
Comment describes these current inconsistencies among marine insurance cases in the Ninth Circuit
and the importance of maintaining uniformity in admiralty law and in uniformly applying the well-
established strict compliance rule.
Due to the many risks inherent in both commercial and recreational
marine voyages, comprehensive insurance is an important aspect of
navigation. And, like all other insurance carriers, marine insurers and
underwriters' require that the owners of the vessels they insure2 comply
with specific terms of coverage. These terms of coverage are typically
outlined in detail within the insurance policy or contract. For example, a
marine policy may restrain the vessel from navigating in certain waters,
from carrying certain types of cargo, or from sailing during seasons of
rough weather. These terms are considered "material" to marine
insurance contracts, and are generally enforceable under federal maritime
law pursuant to the so-called "strict compliance" doctrine.
The strict compliance rule requires that marine insurance policies be
strictly or literally construed, rendering a policy void where the insured
has breached an express policy term or warranty. By contrast, state
insurance law typically requires some connection between a breached
policy term and the loss suffered before the insurer may deny coverage
based upon the breach, even where the policy expressly conditions
coverage on compliance with specific terms.
*The student author wishes to acknowledge that she is employed by LeGros, Buchanan & Paul,
P.S., a Seattle-Anchorage maritime law firm that represents a significant percentage of northwest
marine insurance underwriters.
1. Herein referred to as "insurers."
2. Herein referred to as "insureds."
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Uniformity is an important feature of maritime law and a primary
interest recognized by the Supreme Court; this interest is served by
keeping maritime issues within the sphere of federal law .? However, the
principle of uniformity in admiralty law is not the only value upheld by
courts. For example, in Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
Co.,4 the Supreme Court did not seem too concerned with maintaining
uniformity in interpreting the effects of marine insurance contracts, or at
least subordinated that interest to the concern of securing insurance
regulation to the states pursuant to the McCarran Act.' The Court held
that, in resolving marine insurance issues, resort to state law should
occur absent a controlling federal admiralty statute or judicial rule.
Although the strict compliance rule had been applied in several
jurisdictions at the time Wilburn Boat was decided, the Supreme Court
concluded that the rule was not well enough established to be
controlling. The Court declined, however, to articulate the criteria for a
controlling, "well-established" admiralty rule. Because the states had
been vested with the power to regulate insurance under the McCarran
Act, the Court merely held that it was proper to apply state law.
However, the importance of uniformity has never been completely
abandoned. In fact, the Ninth Circuit has enlarged the Milburn Boat test
to encourage courts to consider how the national uniformity of federal
admiralty law might be affected by the application of sitate law.6 Still,
the Supreme Court holding in Wilburn Boat represented a major
departure from previous uniformity standards.
Since Wilburn Boat, the strict compliance rule has been strengthened
or recognized in a majority of federal jurisdictions.7 ]f there was any
doubt before, it is now clear that the strict compliance rule has become
"well-established." However, over the past decade, several district courts
within the Ninth Circuit have failed to follow this established federal
3. See infra note 40.
4. 348 U.S. 310, reh'g denied, 349 U.S. 907 (1955).
5. Pursuant to the McCarran Act of 1945, particularly 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-12 (1988), a state has
the power to regulate the insurance industry within its borders. For instarce, states may impose
licensing and business practice requirements on its insurance agents and brokers. However, the
McCarran Act does not give states the power to displace federal admiralty rules governing the
interpretation of marine insurance contracts. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 413
(1954). Rather, marine insurance contracts have long been recognized as falling within admiralty
jurisdiction, but not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Insurance Co. v. Dunham,
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1870).
6. Bohemia, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 725 F.2d 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Kossick v. United
Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 741-42 (1961)).
7. See infra note 74.
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precedent.8 Instead, these courts have used Wilburn Boat to justify
rejecting the strict compliance rule and applying various state rules.
These decisions have created a troubling inconsistency in Ninth Circuit
marine insurance law.
In interpreting the strict compliance rule in light of the "well-
established" criterion announced in Wilburn Boat, district courts within
the Ninth Circuit should recognize and follow the conclusion reached in
every other federal circuit where the issue has been addressed: that the
strict compliance rule is a long-standing, well-established rule of federal
admiralty law which must be applied when express marine policy terms
have been breached. Displacing federal law and applying state law in
such cases violates the Supremacy Clause, erodes uniformity and
predictability in federal admiralty law, and ignores the rule set forth in
Wilburn Boat and the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Wilburn Boat in
Bohemia, Inc. v. Home Insurance Co.9
I. MARINE INSURANCE AND THE STRICT COMPLIANCE
RULE
One of the most notable characteristics of ocean travel is uncertainty.'0
In the face of this uncertainty, marine investors, lenders, shippers, and
insurers seek to maintain predictability and certainty whenever
possible." As a result, these maritime actors generally rely upon ancient,
well-established rules of admiralty law which promote consistency and
uniformity.
A. Marine Insurance Contracts and Express Warranties
Because ships are the oldest means of transporting goods, marine
insurance is likely the oldest form of commercial indemnity.'2 There are
many different types of marine insurance covering a wide range of
maritime perils. 3 Marine navigation includes routine risks such as crew
8. See infra note 70.
9. 725 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1984).
10. Nicholas J. Healy and David J. Sharpe, Cases and Materials on Admiralty 1 (1974).
11. Id.
12. Donald T. Rave and Stacey Tranchina, Marine Cargo Insurance: An Overview, 66 Tul. L.
Rev. 371 (1991) (citing William D. Winter, Marine Insurance: Its Principles & Practice 1 (3d ed.
1952)).
13. Common types of marine insurance coverage include: hull and cargo, protection and
indemnity, ship building and repair, charter, towing, stevedore and terminal liability, and pollution.
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injuries and vessel damage, as well as extreme weather, fire, war, pirates,
jettisons, seizures, restraints, and detainments in foreign ports.14
Commercial and non-commercial vessels of all types must procure an
ever-increasing array of property and liability insurance designed to
guard against these diverse risks."5
As with most insurance, in order to recover for a loss under a marine
policy, an insured vessel must demonstrate that it has suffered a loss, and
that the loss suffered fell within the terms of the pol-icy. 16 Terms of
coverage usually include certain duties and obligations imposed upon the
parties by the insurance contract. These duties and obligations are
generally set forth in the express language of the policy in the form of a
warranty.17
An express warranty may contain any specific term or agreement and
becomes part of the insurance contract. For example, an insurer may
require a vessel to agree to remain moored during certain months of the
year or confine itself to sailing only in certain waters. The owner of an
insured vessel may also be expected to comply with specific reporting
requirements. Express warranties, by definition, condition policy
coverage upon compliance with these agreements. Even if these terms
are not specifically identified as "warranties" within the policy, if it is
evident that the parties intended the policy to be contingent upon
compliance with certain expressed terms, such terms are deemed express
warranties. 8
A marine insurer or underwriter should be able to condition its
agreement on a fixed state of facts expressed in the form of policy
warranties. This is especially true with regard to marine insurance,
where potential losses are significant. 9 An important issue in insurance
Raymond P. Hayden and Sanford E. Balick, Marine Insurance: Varieties, Combinations, and
Coverages, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 311 (1991).
14. Healy & Sharpe, supra note 10, at 634.
15. Hayden and Balick, supra note 13.
16. Rave & Tranchina, supra note 12, at 380.
17. Id. at 390. Continual duties may also arise from federal maritime common law. For example,
the common law doctrine of uberrimaefdei imposes upon an owner of an insured vessel a duty of
good faith disclosure of material facts. Albany Ins. Co. v. Anh Thi Kieu, 927 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.
1991).
18. Rave & Tranchina, supra note 12, at 390.
19. The owner of an insured vessel also needs to know the potential comequences of failing to
comply with the express terms of his or her insurance. Moreover, express ;md enforceable policy
provisions motivate owners of insured vessels to avoid risks that the insuranee company has deemed
to be beyond the scope of coverage, as well as to comply with federal and local safety regulations.
522
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law therefore is the legal effect given to express policy warranties. That
is, it is important to determine the effect that an insured's breach of
express policy provisions will have upon coverage in the event of a loss.
It is important for both the insurer and the insured to be able to predict
the result of a breached policy term in order to provide both fairness to
the insurer and incentives to the insured to comply with its obligations
under the policy. However, federal maritime law and state law approach
the effect of breached policy warranties differently. Moreover, rules
vary from state to state. It is therefore important to determine when
federal and state rules apply.
B. Federal Maritime Rules Compared to State Insurance Laws
Since 1869, the Supreme Court has recognized that the power to
regulate insurance companies and contracts is primarily vested with the
states.20 However, like other forms of maritime law, most aspects of
marine insurance transactions have historically been exempt from state
regulation." While each state is free to develop its own insurance law
through legislation and its courts, rules governing marine insurance have
primarily developed from federal and English common law.'
Federal admiralty rules of contract interpretation are generally quite
similar to those applicable to state insurance law.' However, the
concerns underlying state insurance laws are somewhat different from
those served by federal admiralty rules. The aim or focus of most state
insurance regulation, which is typically very intensive and intrusive,24 is
to protect resident policy holders from insolvent insurance companies,
The vessel owner has more to lose than insurance coverage: an owner who fails to limit risk may
endanger human life or the environment, or cause other non-monetary losses.
20. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). See also supra note 5.
21. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 14-15 (1870). There are approximately 425
(total) ocean marine exemptions within the insurance laws of all fifty states (combined), which
exempt marine insurers from rate regulation, form filing, and many other aspects of state insurance
regulation. Marilyn L. Lytle, Recent Legislative Proposals Affecting the Marine Insurance Industry,
Current Issues Affecting Marine Insurance in the Pacific Northwest (University of Washington
Continuing Legal Education Seminar ) 1992, at B1. States do, however, retain some power to
regulate certain activities. For example, many states exclude insurance on yachts and pleasure craft
from standard "ocean marine" insurance exemptions. Id. at B4-5.
22. Dunham, 78 U.S. at 8-9; Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 263 U.S. 487,493
(1921). See also Wilburn Boat v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 310-11 (1955).
23. Bohemia Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 725 F.2d 506, 509 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984).
24. Spencer L. Kimball, Cases and Materials on Insurance Law 621 (1992).
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unreasonable rates, and unfair policy terms' While federal marine
insurance rules have similar aims, admiralty law is also concerned with
maintaining uniform national rules. Since states do not share the same
concern for national uniformity, the approach taken by state legislatures
and courts often differs from that of federal courts in formulating
insurance rules.
A clear example of these different approaches is the effect of an
insured's breach of express policy provisions. State insurance laws,
including those in Washington State,26 typically require a causal or other
relationship between a breached policy term and the loss suffered in
order for the breach to void the policy. This approach is consistent with
the typical state view that insurance policies are contracts of adhesion,
that the parties have disparate bargaining status, and that the insured is
the "weaker" party.27 This rule therefore favors the insured and serves
the state interest of protecting policy holders and sustaining coverage
whenever possible.
By contrast, in the course of developing federal m-aritime law, most
courts in the United States and England28 have recognized and
exclusively applied the strict compliance rule to express marine
insurance warranties.29 Under this approach, express warranties are
strictly construed. When an insured vessel has failed to comply with any
express policy term, the policy is void, regardless of the relationship
between the breach and the loss.30 This rule originated in England and
25. Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A PreA'iminary Inquiry in the
Theory of Insurance Law, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 471 (1961).
26. See, e.g., Transit Casualty Co. v. Pedersen Fisheries, Inc., No. C83-1471R, slip op. at 6 (W.D.
Wash. Feb 11, 1985) (order denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment) ("Where a breach of
warranty has absolutely no relationship to the cause of the loss, then the Washington courts would
hold that it is arbitrary and unreasonable to deny coverage of the loss on the basis of the breach.");
Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. Salzberg, 85 Wash. 2d 372, 535 P.2d 816 (1975); Riordan v. Commercial
Travelers Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Wash. App. 707, 525 P.2d 804 (1974).
27. Kimball, supra note 24, at 12-13; Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpreation and Construction
of Contracts, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 833, 858 (1964).
28. English precedent is acknowledged in Wilbum Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,
348 U.S. 310, 325 n.1 (Reed, J., dissenting).
29. See, e.g., Canton Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Independent Transp. Co., 217 F. 213, 215 (9th Cir. 1914)
(holding that if the language of express warranties were not strictly construed, "such a warranty
would be of no value to either party to the insurance contract"); Thames & Mersey Marine Ins.
Co. v. O'Connell, 86 F. 150 (9th Cir. 1898) (holding that insurer was not liable for loss when a
vessel violated navigation warranties by sailing in prohibited waters).
30. See, e.g., Lexington Ins. Co. v. Cooke's Seafood, 835 F.2d 1364 (1 lth Cir. 1988); Mutual
Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Costa, 789 F.2d 83 (1st Cir. 1986); Aguirre v. Citizens Casualty
Co., 441 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1971).
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was first clearly stated in the United States by the Seventh Circuit in
Fidelity-Phenix Insurance Co. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. 31 The strict
compliance rule has also been recognized and followed in seven other
federal circuits.32
Compared to the typical state approach, applying the strict compliance
rule may appear harsh at first glance. Indeed, it is these sometimes harsh
effects that inspired the Supreme Court to be sympathetic with the
houseboat owners denied coverage in Wilburn Boat.33 However, there
are important and compelling reasons for the rule.
First, from a contract standpoint, express warranties provide the very
terms upon which a contract for marine risk coverage is made. The rule
enforces marine insurance contracts as written and therefore carries out
the intent of the parties and allows them to rely upon their agreement. A
contract, by its very nature, implies obligations which are voluntarily
undertaken.35 Unlike auto or home insurance, marine insurance contracts
are more frequently made between sophisticated parties. Even where the
vessel owner is not sophisticated, an insurance broker is typically
involved to represent the insurance purchaser, to negotiate the coverage
purchased, and to ensure that the scope of coverage, including express
warranties, is clearly understood by the shipowner. Furthermore, if the
shipowner later desires to change or enlarge the terms of coverage to
accommodate a temporary change in insurance needs, the shipowner may
re-negotiate with the insurer for a rider to the policy.
31. 12 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1926).
32. Mutual Fire, 789 F.2d at 83; Goodman v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir.
1979); Home Ins. Co. v. Ciconett, 179 F.2d 892, 894 (6th Cir. 1950); Levine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 139
F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1943); Robinson v. Home Ins. Co., 73 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1934); Cotton Blossom
Corp. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 615 F. Supp. 87 (D. Mo. 1985); Canton, 217 F. at 213.
33. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 320 (1955). See discussion infra
notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
34. Patrick LS. Griggs, Coverage, Warranties, Concealment, Disclosure, Exclusions,
Misrepresentations, and Bad Faith, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 423, 430-31 (1991). For example, in Home
Insurance Co. v. Ciconett the Sixth Circuit stated-
It is settled that a warranty in a contract of insurance must be literally complied with; that the
only question in such cases is whether the thing warranted to be performed was or was not
performed; and that a breach of the warranty releases the company from liability regardless of
the fact that a compliance with the warranty would not have avoided the loss.
Ciconett, 179 F.2d at 894. Thus, an express warranty or agreement in a marine insurance policy
should void the policy if breached, regardless of the connection (or lack thereof) between the breach
and the loss. See, e.g., Vizzini v. Insurance Co., 273 A.2d 137 (Md. 1971).
35. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731,741 (1961).
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In addition, even under the strict compliance rule, a deliberate,
knowing policy breach is generally required to void coverage. This is
because marine policies typically contain "held-covered" clauses, which
prevent a marine policy from being voided by an accidental or unwilling
breach of express policy terms. Such clauses are effective as long as the
insured has exerted its best efforts to remain in compliance and has
promptly notified the insurer of the breach as soon as it is discovered.36
Similarly, most state insurance laws generally do not allow an insured
party, by its own willful misconduct, to unilaterally enlarge the risk that
the insurer has agreed to cover.
Moreover, with the exception of the Supreme Court's failure to
recognize the strict compliance rule as being "well-established" in the
United States as of 1955, it has been a widely recognized and virtually
unchallenged doctrine of marine insurance law for nearly 100 years in
the United States37 and for even longer in England.38 The rule therefore
fulfills traditional and reasonable expectations of both marine insurers
and insureds.
C. The Importance of Uniformity
Perhaps the most important value sought to be preserved in the
interpretation and enforcement of marine insurance contracts is
uniformity.39  The Supreme Court has long recoignized that the
Constitutional preservation of federal maritime jurisdicti.on was intended
to maintain the uniformity of federal admiralty law.4" It is difficult to
imagine an area with more interstate contacts, and herefore federal
36. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 839 F.2d 1366, 1367-68
(9th Cir. 1988).
37. See supra note 29. See also infra note 74.
38. See Bean v. Stupart, 99 Eng. Rep. 9 (1786); De Hahn v. Hartley, 99 Eng. Rep. 1130 (1786).
39. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 54,59 (1950); Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers
Fire Ins. Co., 263 U.S. 487,493-94 (1921).
40. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 574-75 (1874).
One thing... is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred to a system of law
coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have
been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the di!,Vosal and regulation
of the several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and comsistency at which the
Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the
States with each other or with foreign states.
Id. at 575. See also Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160 (1920).
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interests, than marine insurance. This makes adherence to existing,
uniform federal rules imperative.41
Uniformity is particularly important because of the interstate and
international nature of the insurance business. Marine insurance
contracts are possibly the most common42 and complex form of maritime
contract. It is therefore important that the rules, practice, and laws
regarding marine insurance contracts be as consistent as possible
throughout the world.43 A vessel moves from state to state, along coasts
and rivers, and across national borders. It would be disastrous if the
legal construction of maritime insurance contracts changed with every
border a vessel crossed.44
Additionally, if marine insurance laws are variable and inconsistent,
and if insurance contracts are not given the legal effect that the parties
intended, escalating insurance costs are likely to result. The business of
marine insurance will require more litigation and will be more difficult to
manage. High insurance rates will handicap marine industries and
individuals in jurisdictions where courts refuse to recognize the strict
compliance rule.
II. THE DIFFICULTIES OF WILBURNBOAT
A. The Wilburn Boat Rule
In Wilburn Boat v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,45 the Supreme
Court formulated an analysis for determining when federal or state law
applies to marine insurance cases. The houseboat owners in Wilburn
Boat breached an express warranty within their marine policy, and the
houseboat was destroyed by fire. The insurer denied coverage due to the
breach. The trial court applied what it recognized as well-settled
41. Jerome C. Scowcroft, Uniformity in Admiralty Law and the Application of State
Compensation Statutes, Current Issues Affecting Marine Insurance in the Pacific Northwest
(University of Washington Continuing Legal Education Seminar) 1992, at A1-2.
42. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1, 13 (1870). Within his argument that marine insurance
contracts fall exclusively within maritime jurisdiction-a proposition ultimately affirmed by the
Supreme Court-plaintiff's counsel noted that such contracts were perhaps the most common form
of maritime contract See also infra note 77.
43. Insurance Co., 78 U.S. at 13.
44. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 323 (Reed, J., dissenting) (noting
that admiralty laws that change from state to state would do "violence to the premise upon which the
admiralty jurisdiction was constructed" and would "unduly burden" maritime operations).
45. 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
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admiralty law, namely the strict compliance doctrine, and found in favor
of the insurer. This was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.'
However, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court stated that, while
the body of federal admiralty law must first be examined for a
controlling rule,47 if no federal admiralty statute or 'Well-established"
judicially-created rule exists, state law must be applied.48 The Supreme
Court was not convinced, as of 1955 when Wilburn Boat was decided,
that the strict compliance rule had been sufficiently well-established in
the United States to be controlling.49 Therefore, the Court remanded the
case, and the trial court was directed to apply state law."0
The rule articulated in Wilburn Boat is problematic for many
reasons." First and foremost, the Court failed to give proper recognition
to the importance of the basic principle of uniformity in admiralty law
and failed to consider the effect that applying state law would have upon
uniformity and other federal interests.52  The Court should have
attempted to create or develop rules that reflected and were consistent
with established, uniform maritime laws and principles, instead of
resorting to state law. This could have involved looking to English
admiralty law, from which U.S. maritime law originated,53 or looking to
federal circuit court decisions. When an issue is truly maritime in
nature,54 borrowing state law is completely inapposite to choice of law
principles and the supremacy of federal law.
46. 201 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1953), rev'd, 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
47. Wilburn Boat, 348 U.S. at 314.
48. Id. at316.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 321.
51. Wilburn Boat has been strongly criticized for several reasons, including for the Supreme
Court's refusal to apply what was considered by many to be an already "well-established" federal
strict compliance nule, as well as for stating a choice-of-law analysis which works against uniformity
in federal admiralty law. G. Gilmore and C. Black, The Law of Admizahy 69-71 (2d ed. 1975).
Furthermore, the Wilburn Boat rule has the effect of preventing change or development in federal
maritime law. "[A]s to each issue or area of law in which it is held that no federal admiralty rule
currently exists no such nle will ever exist under Wilburn Boat because und.r that doctrine only pre-
existing federal law can ever be applied." Uberrimae Fidei Not Entrench ed Federal Precedent,
Committee on Marine Insurance, General Average, and Salvage Newsletter No. 2, P & I
Subcommittee (May 1991) p. 9588, at 9591.
52. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
53. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Scott, 345 U.S. 4.27,442-43 (1953); Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers
Fire Ins. Co., 263 U.S. 487,493 (1921).
54. Whether a transaction is truly "maritime" and therefore within admintity jurisdiction depends
upon its nature and subject matter, having reference to maritime service or maritime transactions.
Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1, 26 (1870).
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Moreover, the Supreme Court's holding in Wilburn Boat is difficult to
accept even under the very terms of the rule it set forth. Not only did the
Court fail to provide a method for determining when a federal rule is
"well-established," but it also chose to distinguish the strict compliance
rule as a "general warranty rule" rather than an admiralty rule, and
thereby diminished its importance. As a result, at least six federal
circuits ceased uniform application of the rule in admiralty cases.5
B. Applying the Wilburn Boat Test in the Ninth Circuit
Not surprisingly, courts have encountered difficulties applying the
Wilburn Boat test. 6 Determining when to replace a federal maritime rule
with state law has been problematic, especially since the Supreme Court
did not discuss the need for uniformity in admiralty law or any other
factors which might be important in determining when to apply state law.
Beyond uniformity concerns, other relevant factors include competing
state and federal interests and the extent to which state law materially
differs from federal maritime law.
In Kossick v. United Fruit Co.,57 the Supreme Court somewhat
redeemed and reiterated the principle of uniformity in admiralty law,
distinguishing between "maritime" issues that require uniformity and
"local" issues that do not.58 It was not until 1988, however, that the
55. Wilburn Boat, 348 U.S. at 315. The Court attempted to diminish the importance of the fact
that the rule had been applied in the following six circuits: Home Ins. Co. v. Ciconett, 179 F.2d 892
(6th Cir. 1950); Levine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1943); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Houston Oil
& Transp. Co., 49 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1931); Fidelity-Phenix Ins. Co. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.,
12 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1926); Canton Ins. Office v. Independent Transp. Co., 217 F. 213 (9th Cir.
1914); Rosenbauer v. Standard Ins. Co., 1949 A.M.C. 716 (Fla. 1949).
56. Port Lynch, Inc. v. New England Int'l Assurety of Am., 754 F. Supp. 816, 819 (W.D. Wash.
1991).
57. 365 U.S. 731 (1961).
58. Id. at 738. The Court set forth a two-question test in Kossick concerning the application of
state-as opposed to federal admiralty-law to an agreement between a vessel owner and a crew
member. First, the court asked if the agreement was a maritime contract. Since the answer was yes,
the Court then asked if the contract was of such a "local" nature that its validity should nevertheless
be judged by state law. Id. at 735. The Court noted that a contract may be both "maritime and
local," id. at 738 (citing Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921)), "in the sense that the
application of state law would not disturb the uniformity of maritime law." Id. (citing Southern Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917)).
The Kossick Court also noted that, while offending national maritime uniformity was rare, it was
tolerated to allow recovery under state wrongful death and survival statutes in maritime liability
cases or to impose state environmental laws upon vessels engaged in interstate commerce. Id. at
739-40 (citing Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941)). See also Huron Portland Cement v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). The Court concluded that the agreement at issue in Kossick, between
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Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to revisit Wilburn Boat in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Kossick. In Bohemia, Inc. v. Home
Insurance Co.,59 the Ninth Circuit concluded that ie Wilburn Boat
analysis had been enlarged by Kossick to require courts to consider the
impact upon uniformity of applying state law to a marine insurance
issue.' The Ninth Circuit concluded that there should be a new test: If
no federal statute or "well-established," judicially-created rule exists to
cover a particular marine insurance issue, or if there is no need for
uniformity in admiralty practice, then state law must be applied.6' In
other words, the Ninth Circuit determined that it is orly appropriate to
apply state law in marine insurance cases when there is neither a well-
established federal maritime rule nor a recognized need for uniformity
with regard to that particular area of marine insurance law.62
the owner of a vessel and a crew member (to assume liability for imprcper treatment the crew
member received at a public health hospital), was not "peculiarly a mitter of state and local
concern," that it could have been made anywhere in the world, and that it therefore should be
subjected to interpretation under only one body of law, wherever made. Furthermore, the Court
noted that the contract at issue involved obligations voluntarily undertaken, distinguishing wrongful
death and pollution regulation cases where concerns for uniformity are displaced by local concerns.
Id. at 741 (quoting Huron, 362 U.S. at 446). Thus, the Court held that the general rule of
maintaining uniformity was appropriate and that the very rare exceptions of displacing uniformity
were not applicable. Id. at 742.
59. 725 F.2d 506 (1984).
60. Id. at 510.
61. Id.
62. This test acknowledges that, as with all areas of federal regulation, in are circumstances states
may exercise their police power to supplement federal law when the relevant issue is "peculiarly a
matter of state and local concern." Huron, 362 U.S. at 446. See also supra note 58 and
accompanying text. Even so, applying state law in such circumstances may not discriminate against
matters of federal interest, such as interstate commerce, or operate to disruLt uniform federal law.
Huron, 362 U.S. at 448.
A rule similar to that employed in Bohemia was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Koninklyke
Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maalschappy v. Royal Netherlands Steamship Co., 301 F.2d 741 (5th Cir.
1962). "In the absence of a federal statute, a judicially-fashioned federal rule, or a need for
uniformity throughout admiralty jurisdiction relevant state law may be applied." Id. at 743 (citing
Wilburn Boat v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955)). The Fifth Circuit went even further
in Albany Insurance Co. v. Anh Thi Kieu, 927 F.2d 882, reh'g denied, 934 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir.
1991), when it incorporated additional federal common law principles into the Wilburn Boat
analysis. In Albany, the Fifth Circuit formulated a three-factor test for detcrmining when state law
might displace admiralty law under the Wilburn Boat"well-established" criteria. However, the issue
in Albany was the effect of material misrepresentations by the insured rather than breached policy
warranties.
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I. NINTH CIRCUIT: FAILURE TO APPLY STRICT
COMPLIANCE RULE
Pursuant to Wilburn Boat, courts must apply federal maritime rules
that are "well-established" in admiralty law.63 This necessarily includes
the strict compliance rule which, despite its status when Wilburn Boat
was decided, has since become well-established in maritime law.' It
would make little sense for today's courts to rely upon the holding in
Wilburn Boat, which was based upon the Supreme Court's impression of
the strict compliance rule nearly forty years ago. To do so treats the state
of admiralty law as frozen in time.65 Courts in the Ninth Circuit and in
other jurisdictions must recognize the history of the strict compliance
rule and particularly the post- Wilburn Boat history of the rule.
Furthermore, at least in the Ninth Circuit, courts have been directed to
consider the potential impact upon the uniformity of federal admiralty
law when determining whether to apply federal or state law." An
additional and important aspect of national uniformity is to ensure that
the legal rights of parties in admiralty are consistent throughout the
various jurisdictions. When states are given leave to regulate in a
particular area, there is always a risk that state law will infringe upon
established rights under admiralty law. Thus, the general maritime
principle of uniformity, reiterated by the Supreme Court in Kossick, and
by the Ninth Circuit in Bohemia, in addition to the Wilburn Boat "well-
established" precedent test, dictate that courts apply the strict compliance
rule.
A. Wilburn Boat "Well-Established" Test Violated
The strict compliance rule, which requires literal compliance with all
marine insurance policies and voids coverage upon any breach of an
express policy warranty, has been recognized in the Ninth Circuit as a
controlling federal maritime rule for nearly 100 years.67 At present, most
federal jurisdictions have recognized and applied the strict compliance
63. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
64. See infra note 74.
65. In Highlands Insurance Co. v. Koetje, 651 F. Supp. 346, 347 n.2 (W.D. Wash. 1987), the
court stated that under Wilburn Boat "there is no federal admiralty law governing enforcement of
marine insurance warranties," thus assuming that marine insurance law had not evolved since 1955.
66. Bohemia, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 725 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1984).
67. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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rule. 8 Pursuant to Wilburn Boat, when there is a well-established
admiralty rule on a particular marine insurance issue, it must be
applied. 9
Despite the relative clarity of the Wilburn Boat and Bohemia tests,
several district courts within the Ninth Circuit have incorrectly rejected
the strict compliance rule and used state law to interpret marine insurance
contracts.70 In each of these decisions, the district court ignored the well-
established nature of the strict compliance rule, the need for its uniform
application, and interpreted Wilburn Boat as mandating that there is no
recognized express warranty strict compliance rule. In so doing, each
court improperly adopted the Wilburn Boat holding and failed to apply
the Wilburn Boat test.
Historically, the strict compliance rule was the only established rule
applied within the body of admiralty law for interpreting the effect of
breached marine insurance warranties.7 This rule was recognized and
applied in England and in six federal circuits of the United States before
Wilburn Boat.72 This doctrine remained unchallenged until 1955 when
the Supreme Court questioned the strength of the rule irt Wilburn Boat.
73
However, since Wilburn Boat, and despite it, three more circuits have
adopted the strict compliance rule. 4 Thus, the strict compliance rule has
68. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
70. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Liberati, 1989 A.M.C. 1436 (N. D. Cal. 1989); Highlands Ins.
Co. v. Koetje, 651 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Wash. 1987); Rondys, Inc. v. Insuranve Co. of N. Am., 1988
A.M.C. 2234, 2239 (D. Or. 1986), modified, No. 85-904, slip. op. at 10 (1). Or. June 19, 1986);
Transit Casualty Co. v. Pedersen Fisheries, No. C83-1471R (W.D. Wash. Feb. 11, 1985).
71. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 55.
73. Wilbur Boat v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
74. Before Wilburn Boat, the strict compliance rule had been applied in tl. e Second, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. See supra note 55. Post-Wilburn Boat the rule has been
recognized in the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits (see infra), and has been sixengthened in virtually
every other federal circuit. For example, in Lexington Insurance Co. v. Cooke's Seafood, 835 F.2d
1364 (1 lth Cir. 1988), the Eleventh Circuit held that a marine insurance contract was void where the
insured had breached a navigation warranty, incurring loss while operating outside its navigational
limits. The court concluded that, as a matter of general maritime law, strict construction is required
in enforcing-express warranties in marine insurance contracts, and breach of the warranty released
the insurer from liability, even where compliance would not have avoided the loss.
With the exception of a few district court cases in the Ninth Circuit, the strict compliance rule has
been followed wherever breached warranty issues have arisen. See Employers Ins. v. Trotter
Towing Corp., 834 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 841 F.2d 633; Graham v. Milky Way
Barge, Inc., 824 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1987); Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Ins. Co. v. Costa, 789
F.2d 83 (1st Cir. 1986); Parfait v. Central Towing, Inc., 660 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1981); Goodman v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 1040, 1042-43 (4th Cir. 1979); Aguirre v. Citizens Casualty Co.,
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now been applied in at least twenty cases post-Wilburn Boat, in a total of
nine federal circuits, and, with the exception of a few Ninth Circuit
district court decisions which have applied state law, is the only
recognized rule for determining the effect of breached express marine
insurance warranties in federal admiralty law.
In deciding post-Wilburn Boat breach-of-warranty cases, virtually all
courts have found that the strict compliance rule has become "well-
established," regardless of its status before Wilburn Boat. In each case,
the court simply looked to see if the insured party had breached an
express policy term and then held that long-standing maritime law
rendered the policy void due to the breach, regardless of the nature of the
warranty or the connection between the breach and the loss.75 This broad
and virtually unanimous application of the strict compliance rule in a
majority of the federal jurisdictions where the issue has arisen means that
the rule is well-established, widely accepted, and relied upon in the
marine industries.
B. Recognized Need for Uniformity Also Ignored
Furthermore, none of these aberrational district court cases within the
Ninth Circuit properly considered the Ninth Circuit mandate of
uniformity.76 Instead, each court ignored the recognized need for
uniformity in the interpretation of marine insurance express warranties.
In Transit Casualty Co. v. Pedersen Fisheries77 and Highlands Insurance
Co. v. Koetje,7" district courts in Washington ignored Bohemia and
uniformity considerations altogether. In Rondys, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of
North America,79 the Oregon court mentioned Bohemia, but then failed to
consider or discuss uniformity considerations in its analysis or holding.
In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Liberati,0 a California district
441 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1971); F.B. Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Valentine, 431 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1970);
Home Ins. Co. v. Ciconett, 179 F.2d 892, 894 (6th Cir. 1950); Cotton Blossom Corp. v. Lexington
Ins. Co., 615 F. Supp. 87 (D. Mo. 1985); Rosenberg v. Maritime Ins. Co., 1968 A.M.C. 1609 (D. Fla.
1968); Vizzini v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 273 A.2d 137 (Md. 1971).
75. See supra note 74.
76. See Bohemia v. Home Ins. Co., 725 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1984).
77. No. C83-1471R (W.D. Wash. Feb. 11, 1985).
78. 651 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Wash. 1987).
79. 1988 A.M.C. 2234 (D. Or. 1986).
80. 1989 A.M.C. 1436 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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court cited the Bohemia rule and mentioned uniformity," but applied
state law anyway.
Resorting to state law, with no concern for the impact upon federal
admiralty law, undermines and erodes general maritime principles and
creates confusion and unpredictability. It has long been recognized that
the very aim of the Constitution in granting admiralty jurisdiction to the
federal courts is to avoid conflicting rules and to preserve the uniform
working of the maritime legal system. 2
Furthermore, even when a particular state law does not contravene an
established principle of admiralty law, the state law cannot be applied
when its adoption will impair the uniformity and simplicity which is the
basic principle of federal admiralty law 3 or when its adoption will defeat
an otherwise meritorious maritime cause of action." Applying state law
to marine insurance cases does both. First, it impairs federal uniformity
and simplicity by thrusting inconsistent state rules upon federal maritime
parties. Moreover, applying state law defeats substantial, established
rights of marine insurers under existing federal law arid fails to protect
their legitimate expectations that the now well-settled strict compliance
rule will be enforced. Thus, insurers lose the ability to enforce policy
terms or to motivate owners of vessels to comply with requirements
which reduce risk and promote vessel and crew safety.
Overriding uniformity concerns and applying state law is appropriate
only under two circumstances. First, applying state law may be
appropriate when the issue is so local in nature and impact that the
interest in national uniformity is clearly outweighed by the local interests
of the state.8 5  For example, the local and important state interest of
preserving the safety of its environment allows states to require vessels
engaged in interstate commerce to comply with state anti-pollution
81. Id. at 1440.
82. See supra note 40. States may not impose rules or laws which work "material prejudice to the
characteristic features of the general maritime law or interfere with the proper harmony and
uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations." Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205,216 (1917).
83. Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 617 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
398 U.S. 375, 402 (1970)); Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 631
(1959).
84. Byrd, 657 F.2d at 617-18 (citing St. -ilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973, 980 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974)).
85. Id. at 618-19 (citing Bell v. Tug Shrike, 332 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
844 (1964) (determining beneficiary under Jones Act by looking to state domestic relations law)).
See also supra note 58 for examples of "matters of local concern" noted by the Supreme Court in
Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961).
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laws.86 Second, requiring vessel compliance with state law may also be
allowed when the area is one where federal preemption would leave a
complex area largely unregulated, despite complete regulation by the
states." State insurance laws are one example of an area where Congress
has expressly mandated that comprehensive state regulation is preferable
to national insurance laws.8" However, the Supremacy Clause still
prevents even permissible state regulation from displacing established
federal admiralty law.89
Interpreting the effect of breached marine policy warranties does not
fall within either of these exceptions. Maritime insurance contracts are
not "local in nature." Indeed, disputes regarding marine insurance
contracts have long been recognized to fall within admiralty
jurisdiction." Moreover, any potentially "local" state interests in marine
insurance are outweighed by the national interests inherent in a uniform
body of admiralty law.
Furthermore, preempting state law with a well-established federal
rule, which denies coverage to insured vessels that breach express policy
warranties, does not leave a complex area largely unregulated. Marine
insurance, although subject in some respects to state regulation, is also
regulated to some degree under uniform federal admiralty rules and is
actually exempt from many state insurance laws.91 Any gaps in this
regulation may be filled by looking to state law if the issue is truly local
and does not demand application of a national, uniform rule.92
Uniformity concerns dictate that the strict compliance rule continue to
be applied. Courts should apply the federal rule in order to maintain the
integrity of a uniform rule in admiralty law, to enforce legitimate
expectations of marine insurers, and to have insurance policies enforced
as written by requiring the owners of insured vessels to comply with
express policy terms.
86. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
87. Wilbur Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310,316-20 (1955).
88. McCarranActof 1945, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-12 (1988). See supra note 5.
89. Under the Supremacy Clause, state law may not displace federal law. U.S. Const. Art. VI.
However, state police power may be exercised to supplement federal admiralty law in the rare
circumstances where it is necessary to preserve important matters of local concern. See supra note
62.
90. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1 (1870).
91. See supra note2l.
92. Wilbur Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310,316-20 (1955).
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When state law has been applied, the results have been inconsistent,
unpredictable, and non-uniform. In Transit Casualty,"3 the court held
that under Washington law breach of express warranties will not void the
policy unless there is a causal connection between the breach and the
loss. 4 This same rule was applied by the District of O:regon in Rondys.
However, in Highlands, another Western District of Washington case,
the parties agreed that Washington law should apply, and the court
applied a new variation of Washington insurance law. The court held
that marine insurance contracts are voided only upon an insured's breach
of warranty if the breach contributed to the loss, or increased the risk of
loss, of the type sustained.95 Thus, the result in Highlands was the
creation of a more "middle-of-the-road," fact-specific standard.
In Liberati, a California district court rejected 1 oth the "causal
connection" analysis in Rondys and the "increased risk and related to
loss" analysis in Highlands. It then applied a different rule under
California law. The Liberati court held that the policy could not be
voided by a breach of warranty unless the warranty was regarded as a
"material" provision affecting risk, or unless the policy specifically
stated that a breach would void the policy.96 Consequently, in four
separate cases, three distinct rules based on state law have emerged to
confuse marine insurance law in the Ninth Circuit.
An important and well-established marine insurance rule has been
replaced with a handful of different rules based on Washington and
California insurance law, with no demonstrated concern for the effect
such decisions might have upon the uniformity of national and
international marine insurance law. While these four district court cases
seem somewhat insignificant in light of the historically consistent
recognition and application which the federal strict compliance rule has
received, it is important that some modicum of consistency be reinstated
in Ninth Circuit marine insurance cases. Although parties may appeal
these erroneous decisions, federal courts should nevertheless refrain from
spawning any further aberrational maritime jurisprudence.
Currently, insurers of vessels in navigation within ihe Ninth Circuit
are unable to predict what rule will apply when policy holders breach
express policy warranties. They could be subjected to the federal strict
compliance rule or any of three different state rules. Thus, the owners of
93. Transit Casualty Co. v. Pedersen Fisheries, No. C83-1471R (W.D. Wash. Feb. 11, 1985).
94. See supra note 26.
95. Highlands Ins. Co. v. Koete, 651 F. Supp. 346, 347 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
96. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Liberati, 1989 A.M.C. 1436, 1441 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
Vol. 70:519, 1995
Marine Insurance Contracts
every vessel traveling within the Ninth Circuit can do little more than
guess at the legal effect which will be given to the express warranties
within their marine insurance policies. Furthermore, insurers are at risk
of being denied the right to enforce the terms of existing insurance
contracts as written and are left without a useful method for motivating
vessel owners to comply with express policy terms.
C. The Strict Compliance Rule: Properly Applied in the Ninth Circuit
Significantly, the strict compliance rule has been properly recognized
and applied in several post-Wilburn Boat Ninth Circuit decisions. As in
the Fifth Circuit and other jurisdictions, courts in the Ninth Circuit have
recognized that, regardless of the status of the strict compliance rule at
the time of Wilburn Boat, it is now a well-established and uniform rule.97
In Campbell v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,9" for example, an insured
vessel breached a "lay-up" warranty within its marine insurance policy.99
The parties in Campbell recognized the strict compliance rule as
controlling, stipulating that strict and literal compliance with express
policy warranties was required under English law and that this rule
should govern their coverage dispute. The Ninth Circuit accepted this
conclusion without question."0
Similarly, in two cases out of the Western District of Washington,'
marine insurers were successful in avoiding payment on insured vessel
losses. The insured vessel in each case had failed to comply with express
policy terms, and the policy was voided pursuant to the strict compliance
rule. Even as recently as 1988, in Northwestern National Insurance
Co. v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank,'02 the Ninth Circuit recognized
and applied the strict compliance rule.
Moreover, in Port Lynch, Inc. v. New England International Assurety
of America, Inc., °3 despite recognizing the recent trend among district
97. Campbell v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 533 F.2d 496, 497 (9th Cir. 1976); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Ebe, No. C83-14M (W.D. Wash. March 26, 1984); Puritan Ins. Co. v. 13th Regional
Corp., No. C80-717R, slip. op. at 16 (W.D. Wash. June 28, 1983).
98. 533 F.2d at 497.
99. "Lay-up" warranties require the vessel to be moored or "laid-up" during periods notorious for
rough weather.
100. Campbell, 533 F.2d at 497 (citing Marine Insurance Act of 1906,6 Edw. 7, c. 41, § 33(3)).
101. Ebe, No. C83-14M (W.D. Wash. March 26, 1984); Puritan, No. C80-717R (W.D. Wash.
June 28, 1983).
102. 839 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1988).
103. 754 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
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courts in the Ninth Circuit to ignore federal precedent and use the 1955
findings in Wilburn Boat to justify applying state law, the Port Lynch
court nevertheless applied the strict compliance rule, barring coverage
for an insured vessel whose owner had breached an express navigational
warranty."°  The court acknowledged that courts must consider both
Wilburn Boat's "well-established" federal rule inquiry, and the Ninth
Circuit's uniformity requirement set forth in Bohemia. The court held
that the strict compliance rule was not only a well-established federal
rule, but that its application was mandated under the uniformity concerns
of federal maritime law.'05 Additionally, the court held that the finding
in Wilburn Boat that the strict compliance rule was not well-established
was no longer accurate, expressly holding that Wilburn Boat does not
require courts to reject solidly entrenched admiralty law."°
The Port Lynch decision properly applied both the Wilburn Boat test
and the Bohemia analysis. Due to the confusion created by earlier
district court decisions in the Ninth Circuit, this was a refreshing and
important move in the right direction. Courts must resi:ore the integrity
of the federal maritime strict compliance rule in order to be in
compliance with the analysis mandated by the Supreme Court in Wilburn
Boat, to preserve uniformity as required under Bohemia, and to secure
the rights and reasonable expectations of marine insurers and their
insured.
IV. CONCLUSION
For almost 100 years, express warranties within marine insurance
contracts have been strictly construed in United States admiralty law, and
this rule is presently recognized in nearly every federal circuit. Even if
the strict compliance rule was not sufficiently established at the time of
Wilburn Boat, uniformity under Bohemia and fundamental principles of
admiralty and federal common law dictate that whatever rule is being
applied should be consistent with existing federal maritime law.
The inconsistent and confusing line of district court cases which have
emerged in the Ninth Circuit during the past decade eiddence a flawed
perspective on Wilburn Boat, as well as a complete disregard for the
104. "Navigational warranties" confine a vessel to certain waters; the language of the policy
makes it void if such warranties are violated.
105. Port Lynch, 754 F.Supp. at 824 ("IThere is both a judicially fashioned admiralty rule which
applies and a need for uniformity in admiralty practice.').
106. Id.
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principle of uniformity acknowledged by the Ninth Circuit in Bohemia.
These decisions run directly contrary to the well-established federal strict
compliance rule and offend the principle of uniformity in federal
maritime law. Courts must consider the federal interests involved,
including uniformity of admiralty law and other well-established
principles of federal common law before applying state law to admiralty
issues.

